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Abstract: 
Why do some political actors nominate women more than others in the Muslim world? This 
article argues that certain social groups have an instrumental demand for female candidates 
because they believe such candidates will enhance their electoral chances in the wake of gender 
quotas’ adoption. Looking at Jordan, it hypothesizes that small tribes can make big gains by 
nominating women due to the design of the country’s reserved seat quota. This argument 
complements existing perspectives on women’s (under-)representation in the Muslim world, 
which emphasize the role of features of the culture, economy, or religion. The analysis of 
original data on Jordan’s local elections and tribes supports the argument. The article’s findings 
have implications for our understanding of women’s representation, tribal politics, and 
authoritarian elections. 
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In 2007, Jordan reserved 20 percent of the seats on its municipal councils for women. 
Although the quota was uniformly applied to the councils, political actors varied greatly in the 
extent to which they sought to take advantage of it. In Umm El Quttein, a municipality in the 
rural Mafraq governorate in northern Jordan, the Masa’id tribe offered only one candidate for the 
2007 election: a woman. In contrast, the Athamat and Shirfat tribes nominated only men—four 
candidates each—even though two seats were reserved for women. Yet the Masa’id tribe did not 
consistently advance women. In nearby municipalities in Mafraq, such as Salhieh and Safawi, 
the Masa’id tribe nominated only men. What explains those variations? When countries adopt 
gender quotas, why do some political actors nominate more women than others? 
We argue that certain elites nominate women candidates to enhance their electoral 
chances after quota adoption. Once in place, some quotas create powerful incentives for political 
actors that are not particularly supportive of women’s rights to nominate women if they would 
otherwise struggle to win seats. We develop and apply this argument using the case of Jordan. 
We argue that small tribes there (i.e., tribes with few members in their electoral districts), which 
might otherwise win few seats, nominate female candidates to increase their representation.1 This 
is a valuable insight since, according to a recent review of the literature on gender quotas, “there 
has been little research on exactly what kinds of women benefit from quotas.”2 We support our 
argument using original data on Jordan’s elections, encompassing more than 2,300 candidates, 
700 tribes, and 90 municipal councils, as well as qualitative interviews.  
Our argument complements existing perspectives on Muslim women’s representation, 
which highlight the significance of economic structure,3 religion,4 and individual biases.5 Such 
arguments, which show how stereotypes about who and what makes for a “good leader” prevent 
women from being chosen for leadership roles,6 emphasize the ideological—rather than 
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strategic—reasons why political actors in the Muslim world (do not) nominate women. Our 
argument therefore offers a new approach within the growing body of scholarship on gender and 
politics in the region. Yet our argument builds on a substantial literature from other parts of the 
world that demonstrates how elites strategically use gender and gender quotas for their own ends, 
both domestically and internationally.7  
Our study also contributes to policy debates about empowering women in the Muslim 
world. The dearth of women in elected office there has captured international attention,8 
especially since women in the region are relatively literate and their fertility rates are dropping.9 
Our findings suggest that the consequences of international efforts to empower Muslim women 
will be multivalent, as the Jordanian quota enhances the descriptive representation not just of 
women but also of small tribes, which could be considered political minorities. Whereas quotas 
may undermine the influence of tribal and other traditional leaders in ethnically homogenous 
societies by replacing them with women,10 quotas may enhance the influence of some traditional 
groups at the expense of others in more diverse societies. 
Finally, our findings have implications for comparative politics beyond the study of 
gender and gender quotas. First, our approach adds to the growing literature that examines 
variations within tribes and finds that traditional leaders are important political actors in the 
developing world.11 Whereas recent research has emphasized how tribes subordinate women due 
to their commitment to a particular notion of “kinship morality,”12 our research shows how 
kinship groups are willing to strategically champion women in politics to gain representation. 
Thus, the article contributes to our growing understanding of tribes as complex political actors 
motivated both by ideology and incentives. Second, our article further shows how autocrats use 
seemingly liberal policies and institutions to survive. Scholars have long recognized the 
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clientelistic functions of authoritarian elections, especially in the Muslim world.13 Yet in a 
review essay on “elections under authoritarianism,” Gandhi and Lust-Okar noted “the effect of 
elections on social environments needs to be explored” and cited the links between elections and 
gender relations as a lacuna.14 Our findings about Jordan, an electoral autocracy, show how 
quotas can help autocrats mimic the appearance of liberal democracy while not making 
fundamental changes and even over-representing friendly political forces. 
 
Muslim Women’s Representation: Existing Theory 
Researchers studying women’s under-representation in the Muslim world emphasize how 
the interplay of socio-economic conditions, culture, and religion discourages women’s 
aspirations for political office. Perhaps most prominently in this vein, Inglehart and Norris have 
offered a revised version of modernization theory.15 They argue that economic development 
promotes societal modernization, including secularization and urbanization. Furthermore, they 
argue that—as women’s fertility rates drop and labor-force participation rates increase—societal 
modernization encourages norms of gender equality and increased political representation for 
women. In their framework, support for women’s participation in political life is also conditional 
on religious and institutional heritage; in particular, Islam is thought to impede women’s 
representation because its religious leaders are perceived to have embraced traditional views 
regarding women’s rights. A related argument comes from Ross, who also emphasizes the 
importance of low female labor force participation in the region but attributes it to oil-based 
economies rather than Islam.16 Likewise, Benstead et al. agree about the significance of 
patriarchal norms but suggest yet another mechanism: role congruity theory.17 For all of these 
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researchers, Muslim women’s under-representation reflects a shortage in the “supply” of female 
candidates as well as in the “demand” for female candidates by elites and publics.18 
Researchers who have studied women’s representation in other regions also emphasize 
political and institutional factors. Indeed, the widespread adoption of gender quotas may have 
broken the link between economic structure and women’s representation.19 Around the world, 
elites evaluate and select aspirant candidates, including women, according to how likely they are 
to win office and govern effectively. Certain elites, especially leftists, have more reliably found 
women suitable for political office than others, usually for ideological reasons.20 Yet contagion 
theory suggests that parties may nominate women simply to compete with other parties, even if 
they are not left-leaning and especially in multi-member proportional representation systems.21 
Although to the best of our knowledge there is little evidence of elites in the Muslim 
world selecting female candidates because of their partisan ideologies, some research does 
suggest that intra-party dynamics could shape women’s political participation. Such was the case 
in Jordan and Yemen in the 1990s, for example, when women attained leadership positions in 
two conservative Islamist parties, even though those parties’ general positions on women’s 
participation remained unchanged. In those cases, intra-party disagreements on unrelated issues 
created political openings that women seized, leading them successfully to win seats on the 
parties’ decision-making bodies.22 Relatedly, in Morocco in the 2000s, parties stacked their lists 
with women to access patronage after the passage of a quota for women in parliament.23 There, a 
10 percent quota prompted male elites to nominate their poor female relatives as a means of 
controlling elected women and increasing their power. 
Such findings suggest that popular or elite support for women’s representation, per se, 
could matter less than other incentives when it comes to nominating women as candidates in the 
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Muslim world. But under what conditions are political elites’ incentives apt to be aligned with 
women running for political office? Answering that question in Jordan requires an appreciation 
of the local political context. After all, the consequences of quotas depend on the nature of the 
political system in question and the electoral rules.24 In countries where quotas are adopted with 
the intention to protect the status quo while providing the veneer of social progress,25 quotas will 
not necessarily create incentives for political elites to nominate candidates who are likely to 
enhance women’s substantive representation. 
 
The Jordanian Context 
Jordan is a monarchy that holds elections for a national parliament and municipal 
councils. Both bodies serve mainly as mechanisms for distributing state resources.26 Once 
elected, officials distribute patronage, including jobs, cars, and business licenses, to their 
supporters. The clientelistic function of elections in Jordan is not unique, either within or outside 
of the Muslim world.27 
Beyond distributing patronage, the regime uses multiple strategies to ensure that elections 
reinforce its rule. Although political parties in Jordan exist, electoral laws weaken them.28 To 
take one example, consider Jordan’s single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system, in 
which each person casts one vote in his or her multi-member district. This system encourages 
people to vote for tribal candidates, who they believe can help them access patronage, rather than 
for partisan candidates. When electoral manipulation is not sufficient to engineer favorable 
outcomes, the Jordanian regime has influenced election outcomes by committing fraud and using 
other extralegal tactics.29 Due to the challenging context, the main political party, the Islamic 
Action Front, typically boycotts elections, including the elections we examine in this article. 
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Instead, tribes perform many of the functions typically ascribed to parties, including 
nominating candidates. Some tribes select nominees through a deliberative process, which may 
entail tribal elders choosing candidates or a primary. In other cases, members self-nominate. No 
matter the nomination method, most political candidates report that encouragement from family 
members, friends, and tribes prompted them to run.30 As is the case with political parties 
elsewhere,31 tribes in Jordan serve as the essential gatekeepers for potential female politicians. 
 Both Jordan’s parliament and its municipal councils have gender quotas. Currently, the 
150-seat parliament has a 10 percent quota and the councils have a 30 percent quota; both have 
grown over time. At the time data were gathered for this article, the councils had a 20 percent 
quota, which reserved seats for 203 female councilors across 93 councils. The number of total 
seats per council was roughly distributed according to population and ranged from six in rural 
areas to twenty-nine in Irbid, an urban municipality. The number of quota seats per council 
accordingly ranged from two to six. The quota seats were allocated to women who did not win 
seats competitively but received the largest percentage of votes in their districts. 
International pressure encouraged the adoption of Jordan’s municipal quota in 2007. Aid 
initiatives, such as the United States’ Millennium Challenge Account, were conditional on 
Jordan improving women’s inclusion. Consequently, the regime introduced the quota without 
significant domestic backing.32 As David and Nanes write, “on behalf of the quota in the 
municipal councils, there were only limited and disjointed efforts from the women’s movement 
and absolutely no lobbying by female members of parliament… Indeed, women’s organizations 
have displayed marked apathy toward municipal governance in the past.”33 In fact, when the 
government proposed the quota, it was accused of “succumbing to external pressures.”34 That 
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Jordan enacted the quota with a view towards the international community makes it similar to 
many other developing countries.35 
Beyond its typicality in terms of the process of quota adoption, Jordan is an appealing 
case to study because it is an “on-the-line” country globally in the sense that cross-national 
statistical models do a good job predicting the proportion of women in its national legislature.36 
Typical cases are generally appropriate ones for in-depth study of causal mechanisms.37 
Although our empirical tests are necessarily specific to Jordan, the core insights of the argument 
we develop below about strategic candidate nomination practices thus can be applied more 
broadly to countries in the Muslim world with quotas, a point to which we return below. 
 
The Argument: Small Tribes, Big Gains 
In Jordan, tribes have generally preferred to nominate male candidates. First, and as they 
do elsewhere,38 tribes in Jordan subscribe to patriarchal belief systems.39 Second, because tribes 
in Jordan typically seek representation to access patronage, female aspirants often face a difficult 
road as they have fewer patron–client ties.40 
Despite their patriarchal tendencies, Jordanian tribes have had much to gain from 
nominating female candidates after quotas were adopted. The quotas award seats to the women 
who win the most votes in their district but who do not win competitively. Although the quotas 
represent a “floor” rather than a “ceiling,” women historically rarely won without them; of the 
226 women who were elected to municipal councils in 2007, for example, only twenty-three won 
competitively. Yet the presence of the quota has meant that many female candidates are still 
successful—in fact, 71 percent of female candidates were elected in 2007. 
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Given how the quotas are designed, small tribes stand to benefit from nominating 
relatively more female candidates. We define small tribes as tribes with few members in their 
district. As such, a tribe can thus be considered small in one location and large in another 
location. Moreover, the absolute size of the tribe nationally is not necessarily correlated with its 
relative size locally. For example, some of the largest tribes in Jordan as a whole, such as Beni 
Hassan, are small tribes in particular areas. 
Without the quota, small tribes generally have a slim chance of having their male 
candidates win since they cannot turn out enough voters to beat candidates from larger tribes. 
Consequently, small tribes sometimes do not participate in elections. Thanks to the quota, 
however, female candidates can succeed even with the support of relatively few voters. This is 
because the reserved seats are awarded to the women with the most votes who did not win 
competitively; recall that there is no minimum threshold of votes that a candidate must secure to 
win according to the law. According to one study on the 2007 municipal election, “Of the 203 
women who won through the quota, some won less than 1 percent of the votes of their districts 
(in some cases, not winning more than 20 votes) and dozens of others won less than 5 percent.”41 
Since women need fewer votes than men to win, we hypothesize that small tribes are 
likely to nominate relatively more women than other tribes—not because they are more 
committed to women’s representation, per se, but because doing so promotes their electoral 
chances. As a consequence, many feminists who once advocated for quotas in Jordan in the 
hopes of improving women’s substantive representation have since opposed quotas because they 
view them as supporting the election of anti-feminist women from small tribes.42 In an interview, 
one such activist put it this way: “I believe that it is very important to empower women, but the 
quota is not bringing about a new politics. Small tribes have hijacked the quota.”43 In fact, one 
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former municipal councilor told us that she opposed the quota: “The small tribes nominate 
women because they feel like they can control them. Then, when the women councilors try to 
talk, the men councilors make fun, saying, ‘Ha, let the quota have her chance to talk.’”44 
Large tribes may also wish to take advantage of quotas, however, we hypothesize that 
they are more reluctant to nominate relatively many women because they do not wish to 
undermine their male nominees by provoking coordination dilemmas. Recall that in SNTV 
systems, voters choose only one candidate, although multiple candidates win seats in each 
district. Under this system, seats are distributed to the candidates—not the political parties—with 
the most votes. In other words, it is possible for a party to garner the most votes in an electoral 
district but to win few—or even no—seats. A suboptimal outcome for a large party could be 
produced, for example, in a five-seat district if the leading party could capture 50 percent of the 
vote but divided its voters inefficiently (e.g., 40 percent of votes went to one candidate, and 5 
percent each to the two other candidates) or nominated too many candidates. 
Of course, large tribes that consistently win multiple seats in a given district could 
theoretically nominate women after quota adoption without acute worries about vote splitting. 
Yet in such a case, large tribes would have significant incentives to re-nominate incumbent men 
or other male candidates rather than switching to female candidates. First, incumbent politicians 
have better access to patronage resources.45 Second, men have better access to patronage than 
women,46 making them more desirable candidates for tribes if they are assured to win. 
Our argument thus rests on the idea that elections in Jordan present coordination 
challenges to both political elites and voters. On the one hand, tribes—acting like parties—must 
estimate how many seats they are likely to win and nominate an appropriate number of 
candidates. On the other hand, voters must decide which candidate from their tribe to vote for if 
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there are multiple candidates. Either calculation can go awry. Political parties or tribes can 
nominate too many candidates and split their voters in ways that reduce their number of seats. 
They can also under-nominate candidates and waste votes on fewer candidates than what they 
might have been able to support. 
Small and large parties respond differently to these coordination problems. Whereas a 
small party that might hope to gain one seat in an election will likely proceed by nominating a 
candidate, a large party that might gain multiple seats is more likely to under-nominate out of 
fear of creating a vote division problem in which some candidates get more than enough votes to 
win and other candidates do not. As Cox noted in a study of SNTV in East Asia, “assuming that 
parties are reasonably accurate at estimating their total support, a small party would presumably 
rarely under-nominate. Whenever it had a reasonable chance at a seat, it would go for it. In 
contrast, a large party with two incumbents in a district in which it had a chance at three might 
find it difficult to convince its incumbents to take the risk of diluting the party vote too far.”47 
Consistent with that logic, we find that a significant majority of small tribes in Jordan (79 
percent) nominate only one candidate in municipal elections. 
That logic suggests that small tribes in Jordan are more likely than large tribes to take 
advantage of the country’s quota and to nominate relatively more women. Strategic calculations 
will dissuade large tribes in Jordan from nominating many women in the same way that they 
have dissuaded political parties from nominating too many candidates elsewhere. Large tribes do 
not want to risk splitting voters by over-nominating candidates in ways that may decrease their 
representation. In contrast, small tribes have fewer such worries and will seek to take advantage 
of the quota by nominating relatively more women. 
 11 
Returning to the aforementioned municipalities in Mafraq of Umm El Quttein, Salhieh, 
and Safawi, we can see that this argument explains the puzzling variations in the relative number 
of female candidates across tribes and municipalities. Although all three municipalities are rural 
and have relatively homogeneous populations, the Masa’id tribe nominated only a woman in 
Umm El Quttein and only men in Salhieh or Safawi. The key difference lies in the relative size 
of the Masa’id tribe. Larger tribes in Umm El Quttein, such as the Athamat and Shirfat tribes, 
nominated many men and no women. In contrast, Masa’id has few members there, whereas the 
tribe is native to Salhieh and Safawi. In Umm El Quttein, the Masa’id tribe gauged that it 
probably did not have enough votes to win a council seat outright and nominated a female 
candidate. The Masa’ids did that despite being a tribe of Bedouin origins, which, as we explain 
later, makes them more likely to hold patriarchal views. In Salhieh and Safawi, the Masa’id tribe 
was larger and felt secure enough in its voters that it nominated men. 
Anecdotes support that interpretation. According to one study, the leaders of large tribes 
disapprove of female members deciding to run for municipal council without tribal support, 
believing that “running on the quota was only suitable for small and/or weak tribes.”48 Recalling 
the experience of a female candidate who ran alongside her male relatives despite not being 
nominated by her tribe, a staff member at a civic organization related, “Everyone tried to deter 
her [from running]...because you are going to hinder the success of your cousin. Even her uncles 
didn’t support her. None of the candidates [from her tribe] succeeded… She won 923 votes but 
she didn’t obtain the [number needed for a] quota seat...even now there are social problems with 
her husband’s family...They...blame her for being the reason for failure.”49 Even female elected 
officials, such as Firdaws Al Khaldi, who infamously won her council seat with no votes, have 
made public statements that highlight the existence of elite coordination problems and tribes’ 
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lack of support for female candidates. Speaking to the Jordanian newspaper Al Dustour about 
why she did not vote for herself, Al Khaldi said, “I was committed to the tribe’s rallying around 
one candidate, who unfortunately did not win a seat in spite of his great service to the area.”50 
Summing up, we argue that small tribes will nominate relatively more women because 
they find it difficult to gain representation otherwise and are less concerned about vote-splitting. 
We test this argument with new data on Jordanian elections. Though our tests are necessarily 
unique to Jordan, our core theoretical insight should apply to other cases in the Muslim world 
(and beyond): When quotas do not require parties to nominate female candidates and multiple 
candidacies harm parties’ electoral chances, then small parties will be more likely to nominate 
women and use quotas to their advantage. Indeed, elites associated with such parties have a 
genuine interest in the success of their women candidates, regardless of their religion, religiosity, 
or ideological support for gender equality. An example of another country where our argument 
could be tested is Afghanistan, which also has an SNTV electoral system and is a case of 
considerable interest to both international organizations and political scientists.51 Our argument 
suggests an explanation for the finding that the quota there has had limited success there in terms 
of advancing women’s substantive representation:52 Quotas can encourage actors who are 
unconvinced of the virtues of women in political life to nominate women out of a desire to win. 
 
Data and Methods 
Testing our argument requires new data on elections, tribes, and municipalities in Jordan. 
Due to space limitations, we confine the tests of our argument to the quantitative analyses 
described below. These analyses are, however, informed by qualitative interviews, some of 
which are cited above and all of which are described in the supplementary information.53 
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Unit of Analysis 
Our unit of analysis is the tribe–municipality; in other words, we examine the candidate 
nomination practices of particular tribes in particular municipalities, such as the Masa’id tribe in 
Umm El Quttein or the Athamat tribe in Umm El Quttein. Tribes’ strategic calculations, ethno-
religious traits, and socioeconomic environments could all affect their nomination patterns. As 
discussed above, we focus on tribes because they are the primary political actors in Jordan. 
In this article, we focus on variations in the nomination of candidates for municipal 
councils, although our argument could equally apply to candidates for parliament. These councils 
are responsible for parks, public buildings, sanitation, streets, and other local services. Our focus 
on local elections is mostly a practical matter: An international donor working in Jordan 
assembled and granted us access to unique data on Jordan’s municipalities. Similar data on 
parliamentary districts do not exist and cannot be imputed from our information about the 
municipalities. Without such data, it is impossible to test our argument against plausible 
alternative explanations. That being said, our local focus arguably provides a hard test of our 
strategic theory since tribes in Jordan should be at least as—if not better—informed and 
coordinated in their behavior around national elections. After all, national elections involve 
fewer seats and higher stakes in terms of prestige and access to the state and patronage.54  
We gathered election and municipality data from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, the 
Department of Statistics, and the Local Governance Development Program, a program funded by 
the U.S. government. Unfortunately, this program only assembled data on the 2007 election, so it 
is not possible to compare the nomination of women before and after introduction of the quota. 
Still, this dataset is very rich as it identifies over 2,300 candidates for the 2007 municipal 
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elections. As described in the supplementary information, we classified the candidates by tribe 
using reference books and local knowledge. In total, 761 tribes nominated candidates across the 
93 municipalities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. We do not classify 
candidates by political party because only a minuscule number of local candidates are primarily 
affiliated with parties according to the interviews described in the supplementary information. 
Below, we describe our dependent, independent, and control variables. Summary 
statistics are provided in the supplementary information. When examining the data, note that this 
article seeks to explain variations in the relative number of women that tribes nominate. Thus, 
we exclude tribes that nominate no candidates from the analysis.55 The most common tribes that 
do not nominate candidates are Palestinian. According to survey data, Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin are no more or less likely to support gender equality than other Jordanians.56 
Consequently, their exclusion should not bias our results. 
 
Dependent Variable 
As we argued earlier, we expect small tribes to offer relatively more female candidates 
than other tribes. Our main dependent variable (gender difference) is the difference between the 
number of female and male candidates offered by a tribe in a municipality. It ranges from 2 (two 
more female than male candidates) to -19 (nineteen fewer female than male candidates).57 In a 
robustness check, we use an alternative dependent variable: the proportion of female candidates 
nominated by a tribe in a municipality (female proportion). 
 
Explanatory Variable: Small Tribe 
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We expect small tribes to use the quota to gain representation. Unfortunately, it is 
uncertain whether official data on tribe size exist, despite our multiple attempts to locate and 
obtain such information. Data on tribe size are politically sensitive, as they reveal information 
about the sizes of the Palestinian population and tribes supportive of the monarchy. 
Our primary measure of tribe size thus relies upon an expert survey. To determine the 
size of tribes, we contacted at least one Jordanian in each municipality (N = 93) that was 
knowledgeable about the subject of local tribes.58 Information about the sample and our survey 
questionnaire is provided in the supplementary information. All respondents were given the 
names of the tribes in their municipality that offered candidates in the 2007 municipal elections 
and asked to comment on whether the membership size of the tribe within the municipality was 
“small,” “medium,” “large,” or unknown. All tribes assessed as “small” were coded as such 
(small tribes). Based on that process, we were able to code 97 percent of the tribes in our dataset, 
80 percent of which were considered small. Lending credence to our argument, small tribes on 
average nominated only around 0.9 more male than female candidates, in contrast to other tribes, 
which nominated around 3.5 more male than female candidates on average. 
We also coded tribe size using searches of Jordanian websites. For example, for the tribe 
of Masa’id in the municipality of Umm El Quttein, we entered the following search terms into 
Google (translated into Arabic): “Masa’id + Umm El Quttein site:.jo”. Tribe–municipalities 
ranged from zero Google hits to over 4 million, with an average of 1.9 million. In the analyses 
below, we classify tribes as small in a municipality if they received fewer than 10,000 Google 
hits, however, our results are robust to other cut-offs (e.g., 5,000 or 50,000 Google hits) as well 
as a continuous indicator (i.e., the natural log of the total number of Google hits). 
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Control Variables 
Socioeconomic and Cultural Variables Previous scholars have argued that Islam impedes 
women’s political participation. Although some have argued that it is a country’s religious 
heritage that matters, others posit that individuals’ religious commitments shape their support for 
women’s representation.59 To test the argument that Muslim individuals are less supportive of 
women leaders, we thus include a binary indicator of whether a tribe is Christian (Christian 
tribe). 3 percent of the tribes in our dataset are Christian; the rest are Muslim. 
Relatedly, tribes of Bedouin origin may offer relatively fewer female candidates because 
they oppose gender equality. First, women in nomadic societies, of which Bedouins are a subset, 
were historically controlled to promote tribal cohesion.60 Second, Bedouins tend to be relatively 
poor and lack education,61 and Inglehart and Norris identify wealth and education as factors that 
promote acceptance of women’s participation in political life.62 We code a tribe as Bedouin if the 
Jordanian government designated it as such during the previous parliamentary elections. 16 
percent of tribes in our dataset are Bedouin. 
Finally, we include measures of the percentage of Jordanians within the municipality who 
live at the poverty level (poverty rate) as well as population density (density). We expect 
wealthier municipalities to have higher education levels, which could lead to greater popular 
support for women’s political participation.63 Similarly, urban areas may be associated with more 
liberal values regarding gender equality . Population density is calculated by dividing the 
municipality’s total population in 2004 by the municipality’s area. 
 
Electoral Districts Some municipalities are divided into multiple electoral districts. That 
fragmentation may either encourage or discourage tribes from running female candidates, 
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depending on their membership levels in each of these districts. We therefore control for the 
number of electoral districts in the municipality (electoral districts). 
Moreover, although the number of seats on a council is related to population , the number 
of seats per capita varies across districts. When districts have more seats, more tribes may offer 
female candidates or each tribe may nominate relatively more female candidates. We thus 
calculate the average of the number of seats per district within a municipality (seats per district). 
 
Tribal Cohesion Some tribes are fractionalized and candidates run regardless of whether the 
tribe endorses them. Power struggles within the tribe, a poor selection process, and internal 
factions can all undermine tribal cohesion. Since more cohesive tribes tend to nominate fewer 
candidates, all else being equal, we include cohesion in our analyses.64 We measure tribal 
cohesion by calculating the ratio of the number of seats that a tribe could have won to the 
number of candidates it ran. More details about this measure are in the supplementary 
information. 
 
Estimation  
We mainly use hierarchical linear modeling to evaluate our argument as both tribe- and 
municipal-level factors could affect our outcome variable. Multilevel modeling accommodates 
this data structure and can account for potential correlation between municipalities in the dataset. 
If we did not pool our data (i.e., only used tribe-level variables), then classical linear regression 
would produce variable inferences. If we pooled all of our data (i.e., only used municipal-level 
variables), we would obscure potentially important variation within the municipalities. 
Therefore, we rely on the partial pooling that multilevel modeling permits.65 
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Findings 
To test our theory, we estimate a number of regressions. In the baseline model (Model 1 
in Table 1), we include measures of whether the tribe is small, Christian, or Bedouin in origin, as 
well as the municipality’s density and poverty rate. As we theorized earlier, small tribes may 
nominate relatively more female candidates to improve their electoral representation. The other 
four variables test the alternative explanations for female candidates, especially those that 
emphasize socioeconomic and cultural factors. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Tribe-Level Variables     
Small Tribe 2.41*** 2.34*** 2.33*** 3.27** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.41) (1.46) 
Bedouin Tribe -0.72*** -0.61** -0.85**  
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.42)  
Christian Tribe 0.45 0.45 0.63**  
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.30)  
Tribal Cohesion  -1.10***   
  (0.32)   
Municipality-Level Variables     
Poverty Rate -0.01 -0.01   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
Density 0.03 0.01   
 (0.03) (0.03)   
Electoral Districts  -0.01   
  (0.02)   
Seats Per District  0.01   
  (0.04)   
Municipality Fixed Effects? No No Yes Yes 
Tribe Fixed Effects? No No No Yes 
N, tribes 739 736 758 758 
N, municipalities 87 87 93 93 
Table 1: The Effect of Small Tribes. Notes: The dependent variable is the number of female 
candidates minus the number of male candidates nominated by a tribe in a given municipality. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are hierarchical linear models; Models 3 and 
4 are least squares regressions with standard errors clustered on municipality or municipality and 
tribe. *** denotes p < 0.01, ** denotes p < 0.05, and * denotes p < 0.10. 
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As Table 1 shows, small tribe is indeed correlated with relatively more female 
candidates. Whereas small tribes are associated with just 0.9 more male candidates than female 
candidates on average, other tribes are associated with 3.3 more, holding all else equal. As 
expected, Bedouin tribe is associated with relatively fewer female candidates, although the effect 
size is smaller. Holding all else equal, a Bedouin tribe is predicted to nominate 2.0 more male 
than female candidates, compared to 1.3 more male candidates for other tribes. The other 
variables—Christian tribe, poverty rate and density—are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (i.e., p < 0.05). 
We next expand our baseline model to a full model that incorporates additional control 
variables: tribal cohesion, electoral districts, and seats per district (Model 2). Both small tribe 
and Bedouin tribe are still positively and negatively, respectively, associated with relatively more 
female candidates. Table 2 displays the substantive impact of the variables, showing that the 
effects associated with small tribe and Bedouin tribe are again large. Christian tribe continues to 
be statistically insignificant. Finally, the coefficient estimate for tribal cohesion is statistically 
significant, with cohesive tribes nominating relatively more male candidates, whereas neither 
density nor poverty have statistically significant relationships with the outcome variable. 
Variable Shift Mean Change in Predicted Value 
Small Tribe from 0 to 1 2.4*** (-3.6, -0.8) 
Bedouin Tribe from 0 to 1 -0.6** (-2.4, -1.1) 
Christian Tribe from 0 to 1 0.4 (-1.9, -0.1) 
Tribal Cohesion from 25th to 75th percentile -1.1*** (-1.4, -1.0) 
Table 2: Simulated Changes in Predicted Values of Gender Difference. The predicted values 
were estimated by shifting one variable at a time from Model 2, while holding all other 
numerical variables at their means and qualitative variables at their medians. 95 percent 
confidence intervals are in parentheses. Note that no municipality-level variables attain statistical 
significance. *** denotes p < 0.01, ** denotes p < 0.05, and * denotes p < 0.10. 
 
Additional analyses confirm the results. In Models 3 and 4, we introduce municipality 
and tribe fixed effects in an least squares framework, clustering the standard errors by 
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municipality or municipality and tribe. These robustness checks ensure that we account for 
omitted variables that our controls do not address. Model 4 is particularly interesting because it 
takes advantage of the fact that the same tribe is small in one municipality and not in another 
municipality to investigate how tribe size affects tribes’ candidate nomination practices. 
Finally, we perform a series of robustness checks using our baseline and full models, the 
results of which are in the supplementary information. In all cases, we find that small tribe 
remains significantly and positively related to our dependent variable.  
1. To deal with missing data from our expert survey, we first code all those tribes about 
which experts were unable to comment as large and then as small.  
2. We use an alternative coding for tribe size based on Google hits data.  
3. We use the proportion of female candidates nominated as our dependent variable.  
4. To explore whether certain tribes—perhaps those that are traditionally loyal to the king 
(e.g., ethnic Jordanian tribes) or those that are not traditionally loyal to the king (e.g., 
ethnic Palestinian tribes)—nominate female candidates to demonstrate their support for 
the regime, we: (1) introduce an indicator for whether the tribe is ethnically Palestinian; 
and (2) introduce an indicator for municipalities with majority Palestinian populations. 
5. We introduce an indicator variable for tribes coded as “medium” by our expert survey.  
6. To explore spatial dynamics, we: (1) add indicators for the twelve governorates into 
which the municipalities are grouped; and (2) sub-set the analysis by governorate.  
7. We introduce an indicator variable for urban municipalities.  
8. To explore spillover effects, we control for municipalities that border other municipalities 
electing a large number (five, six, or seven) of female candidates. We also interact small 
tribe and the indicator for female-friendly neighboring municipalities.  
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The analyses show consistent support for our argument about the strategic entry of 
female candidates. Small tribes are associated with relatively more female candidates, even when 
we control for a number of relevant factors that could also affect the probability of a tribe 
running female candidates. Just as significant, the effect of small tribes is the largest effect that 
we find in substantive terms. There is mixed support for the alternative explanations. Bedouin 
tribes nominated relatively more men. None of the other variables, however, have effects that are 
robust across all models. Thus, we conclude that our strategic theory does the best job of 
explaining differences across tribes and municipalities in the nomination of women. 
 
The Origins of Small Tribes 
One limitation of the analysis is that small tribes could be located in relatively “modern” 
parts of Jordan. Perhaps small tribes moved to wealthier or denser municipalities. Or perhaps 
members of small tribes are more likely to be economic migrants to the municipality, which 
suggests that they may be better-educated and possibly more open to female political 
participation. If these conditions were to hold, then they would provide an alternative 
explanation for the generally weak empirical support for the socioeconomic variables. 
To ensure that our “treatment” group of small tribes is similar to the control group of 
other tribes, we match these groups using several relevant variables and nearest-neighbor 
propensity score matching.66 This method improves the balance in our data, with the mean 
differences being reduced for all covariates and the percent improvements averaging 99 percent. 
After matching, we repeat the baseline and full models from Table 1. As Table 3 shows, even 
after matching, small tribes are associated with significantly more female candidates than male 
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candidates. The estimated difference between the number of female and male candidates 
nominated in the full model is 0.8 for small tribes versus 2.3 for other tribes. 
 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 
Tribe-Level Variables   
Small Tribe 2.23*** 2.18*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
Bedouin Tribe -0.75*** -0.65*** 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Christian Tribe 0.45 0.44 
 (0.44) (0.44) 
Tribal Cohesion  -1.03*** 
  (0.31) 
Municipality-Level Variables   
Poverty Rate -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Density 0.03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Electoral Districts  -0.01 
  (0.02) 
Seats Per District  0.02 
  (0.04) 
N, tribes 708 708 
N, municipalities 75 75 
Table 3: The Effect of Small Tribes, Post-Matching. Note: Nearest-neighbor propensity score 
matching with replacement was used. The treatment was small tribe. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** denotes p < 0.01, ** denotes p < 0.05, and * denotes p < 0.10. 
 
Another alternative explanation is that small tribes may be more “modern” than large 
tribes because their tribal identity finalized later. However, there is no evidence that suggests the 
evolution of tribal identity for small tribes is slower than for large tribes. Moreover, there is no 
reason to believe that tribes with a newer identity would be more supportive of women’s 
representation. The opposite possibility—that small tribes are more cohesive than large tribes 
and, therefore, more willing to run female candidates because they can better control their policy 
choices—is also not likely to be true. As Figure 3 in the supplementary information shows, 
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larger tribes are actually somewhat more cohesive than small tribes. In sum, accounting for the 
potentially unique traits of small tribes only confirms our earlier conclusions.  
 
Conclusion 
In Jordan, after a gender quota was enacted, small tribes disproportionately took 
advantage of the reform to gain representation. Indeed, small tribes in Jordan frequently used the 
women’s quota to win council seats, whereas larger tribes, which could more easily win seats 
competitively, did not. The enlargement of political deliberation to include peripheral groups is a 
normatively desirable phenomenon, but it also means that women nominated via the quota are 
likely to face double discrimination: first, as women and second, as representatives of small 
tribes. In this context, it is unfortunately not surprising that Jordanian women on municipal 
councils are mocked67 and socially ostracized for engaging in traditionally male activities.68 
Our findings about the tribal uses of the gender quota in Jordan tell us something not only 
about how tribes elsewhere in the Muslim world might respond to gender quotas but also about 
the behaviors of a range of conservative political parties given that tribes in Jordan behave so 
much like parties. Clark and Schwedler found that Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen acted 
strategically with regards to women’s participation.69 Islamists may similarly nominate women 
when it is to their advantage and discourage their participation when it might divide the party. 
Like tribes, strategic considerations shape Islamists’ support for women’s political participation. 
Our findings are also significant for policy makers and practitioners who are interested in 
supporting women’s representation in the Muslim world and beyond. Not only are gender quotas 
and tribes present in a number of countries, but Jordan is also representative of broader trends in 
that it adopted gender quotas out of desire to appeal to Western donors.70 In the presence of 
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external incentives, countries that adopt quotas because of international pressure may 
immediately increase women’s descriptive representation, but find that substantive benefits of 
women in office will only manifest with time. Understanding the longer-term substantive and 
symbolic effects of quotas in Jordan and elsewhere in the Muslim world will be a welcome 
direction for future research. 
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